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Abstract
This paper discusses how everyday technologies contribute to the enaction of disability, in particu-
lar by continually frustrating the formation of a general sense of ease in the world. It suggests that 
bodies have a fundamental relationality, within which technology comprises a central aspect; and 
that the very entity called the human is constituted through relationships with technologies. Then, it 
considers two ways that the organisation of technology is involved in the realisation of both ability 
and disability. First, it describes how the distribution of technological resources for activity are cen-
tred around bodies that are attributed normality and correctness, which also de-centres bodies falling 
outside this category: the former are enabled to act while the latter are not. Second, it proposes that 
ability and disability also involve habit: activities that have not only been repeated until familiar, but 
in which body and technologies can be forgotten. That typical bodies are centred allows them to de-
velop robust habitual relationships with technological environments in which body and technologies 
can recede from attention, and crucially, to acquire a sense that their engagements will generally be 
supported. Atypical bodies, as de-centred, lack this secure ground: they cannot forget their relations 
with environments, and cannot simply assume that these will support their activity. This erodes bodi-
ly confi dence in a world that will support the projects, whether ordinary or innovative, that constitute 
a life.
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Introduction
This paper discusses how everyday technologi-
es and environments contribute to the enaction 
of disability, in particular by continually frustra-
ting the formation of a general sense of ease in 
the world. Well-known work in disability studies 
outlines how relationships with the world can be 
splintered, such that the body stands out as ra-
dically objectifi ed (Paterson and Hughes, 1999). 
I am proposing that a less-evident phenomenon 
coexists with these more dramatic occurrences: a 
persistent, low-level uncertainty that arises becau-
se environments are not especially habitable in 
the fi rst place, and prohibit some bodies from for-
ming stable relations. Very mundane technologi-
cal dimensions of everyday environments are or-
ganised around material characteristics of bodies 
identifi ed with a normal human type: this enables 
them to act, and, though habituation, to become 
generally at ease in the world. Their relations with 
things and environments rarely come into ques-
tion. Since the bulk of such environments rarely 
consider the organisation of anomalous embodi-
ments, these individuals are less able to act, and 
are hampered from developing robust habitual re-
lationships. The body, and its hold on the world, 
remain perpetually in question. To address this, 
I fi rst sketch some common ways of understan-
ding bodies and technologies, before outlining my 
alternative position on these: that bodies have a 
fundamental relationality, within which technology 
is a core dimension; and that common and ubiqui-
tous ways of relating with technologies constitute 
the very entity called ‘the human’. Then, I consider 
two ways that technologies, as ordered around a 
certain idea of the ‘normal human subject’, contri-
bute to the realisation of both ability and disability. 
First, typical bodies are centred by the distribution 
of technological resources for many ordinary acti-
vities (these bodies, while merely numerically pre-
valent, are attributed normality and correctness) 
which also de-centres atypical bodies (bodies that 
are attributed abnormality and error): the former 
are enabled to act while the latter are not. Second, 
it considers how ability and disability also involve 
habit: by habit I mean not just something repeated 
until familiar, but in which body and technologies 
can be forgotten (Ahmed, 2007). Because typical 
bodies are generally centred, they can develop 
robust habitual relationships with technological 
environments (that include very banal mundane 
technologies that support or inhibit activity while 
themselves going unnoticed). Crucially, they can 
acquire a sense that technological environments 
will generally support their engagements. Atypical 
bodies, as de-centred, lack a secure ground, and 
cannot simply assume that environments will sup-
port their activity. This erodes bodily confi dence 
in a world that will support the projects, whether 
ordinary or innovative, that constitute a life.
 Human Autonomy and Instrumental 
Technology
I will fi rst outline some settled notions about hu-
mans and their relationships with technology, fol-
lowed by implications for how disability is under-
stood. These notions concern what Christopher 
Watkin (2017) calls ‘host properties’ and ‘host ca-
pacities’: attributes or powers deemed essential 
to and defi nitive of the human. In one story that 
has prevailed in the West at least since modernity, 
both in philosophy and more broadly, the hallmark 
human capacity is autonomy as “independent, 
rational self-determination” (Scully, 2014, 212). 
Here, individual humans possess an inbuilt faculty 
for reason. This furnishes objective and universal 
knowledge and precipitates self-caused action by 
disengaging from and transcending particularities 
(Solomon, 1988): from bodily exigencies and emo-
tional attachments, to norms and conventions of 
concrete social contexts (Latour, 2008). Put simp-
ly, humans are autonomous because they can—
in principle, if not always in fact—independently 
formulate goals and bring these to fruition. This 
modern account makes several distinctions. It dif-
ferentiates humans from everything non-human. 
Humans are subjects: they alone have meaning, 
value, and freedom as possibilities. Everything 
else—nonhuman organisms, vegetal life, manufac-
tured artefacts—gets thrown together as so many 
objects arrayed within neutral geometric space 
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(Latour, 1993). It conceptualises freedom as se-
paration from or transcendence of relations and 
attachments. This also carves the human into 
an active, rationally-free subjectivity and a passi-
ve, causally-determined body. Moreover, only the 
former bears the hallmark of the human; nothing 
bodily truly defi nes humanness. Indeed, realisati-
on of autonomy involves appropriation of that very 
body (Esposito, 2015; Esposito, 2012).
The primacy of autonomy is evident in a 
common understanding of technology. In ‘instru-
mentalism’ (Borgmann, 1984), technologies are 
mere instruments, and are “subservient to values 
established in other… spheres” (Feenberg, 2002, 
5). That is, technologies are epistemically and mo-
rally neutral: the values determining their design, 
fabrication and application come from humans 
alone. Moreover, technologies do not contribute 
substantively to autonomy: they are mere vehicles 
that only expedite or extend freedom that resi-
des solely in human users (Latour, 1999). Again, 
we see distinctions between essentially different 
kinds (Sharon, 2014): subjective and active hu-
mans, objective and passive technologies. Sig-
nifi cantly, this implies a defi nition of the human 
as independent of technology. If technology de-
pends upon a prior and preeminent human sphe-
re, such a sphere must exist, and along with it a 
pre-technological human. This dovetails with the 
foregoing humanist account: in both the human 
host capacity—namely, autonomy—pre-exists, and 
is independent of, technology and relations more 
generally (Watkin, 2017). I will dispute these posi-
tions in due course.
This cluster of ideas about the autonomous 
human informs a common understanding of abili-
ty and disability. Here, ability is the capacity to do 
things voluntarily and independently; this lines up 
closely with the aforementioned conceptualisation 
of autonomy. Ingunn Moser notes how a nondisa-
bled, ‘normal subject’ is said to possess “a sort of 
disposition or available functionality” that permits 
voluntary, detached action, because it is “discon-
tinuous, bounded and detached” (2006, 383). It is 
free because it can transcend attachments. This 
capacity is always available, even when not in use. 
In a similar vein, Joel Michael Reynolds (2018) 
describes how humans are purported to enjoy an 
objective standard of normal ability that is largely 
invariant (notwithstanding normal phases of rela-
tive ability during certain life stages). Furthermore, 
during these long phases of ability, humans are ta-
ken as “independent, not in need of care, and effe-
ctively invulnerable” (Scully, 2014, 214).
In such an understanding, disability identifi -
es something about a body that precludes or in-
hibits the autonomy available to normal humans. 
Disability drags someone away from transcending 
human freedom and towards limiting material ob-
jectivity, leaving them “trapped in and by the body” 
(Frost, 2016, 7). Put differently, disability implies 
dependency, the antithesis of autonomy. Disabled 
people are dependent in the same measure that 
they lack the pristine autonomy of normal human 
subjects. Indeed, disability is often identifi ed with 
dependency upon others, state apparatuses, and 
technologies (Scully, 2014). Disabled subjects, for 
instance, depend upon prosthetic technologies to 
artifi cially compensate for the autonomy they lack 
(Moser, 2006). Here we see a further division. Whi-
le disabled people may be human in principle, this 
status remains ambiguous: since they are diminis-
hed in a signature human capacity—with purpor-
tedly inevitable entailments for their potential to 
enjoy the good life—they are separated from full 
humanness.
 Bodies and Technological Praxis: 
Actor-Network Theory and 
Postphenomenology
I will now outline an alternative approach to em-
bodiment and technology. This begins from a 
phenomenological claim about bodily praxis: that 
in their everyday, engaged modality, bodies are 
not closed and static objects, but lived, pragma-
tic ‘organs’ of movement and connection, that 
are centrally involved in thinking and acting (Mer-
leau-Ponty, 2012). Embodied existence is inesca-
pably dynamic, since bodies are perpetually in 
dialogue with their surroundings; particular, sin-
ce bodies are always “somewhere and at some 
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time” (Sharon, 2014, 137); and perspectival, since 
bodies apprehend things from their relative, limi-
ted, and changing position. This local perspective 
involves signifi cance. Things do not manifest as 
blank presences, but as imbued with meanings 
produced by interplay between bodily concerns 
and surroundings (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). When 
someone is hungry and tired, a restaurant appears 
farther away, a chair more comfortable, than when 
they are satiated and well-rested. This is an initi-
al way that bodies are relational: they are “open 
[systems] of dynamic exchanges with the world” 
(Weiss, 2008, 89), where this world comprises im-
mediately signifi cant things and situations.
Bodies are relational in another sense. Em-
bodied activity overfl ows corporeal boundaries 
to integrate bits and pieces of the extra-somatic 
world. This is illustrated by Maurice Merleau-Pon-
ty’s oft-cited description of a non-sighted man 
whose cane is so deeply absorbed within engaged 
activity that it becomes one sense organ among 
others (Merleau-Ponty, 2012).1 I take these inti-
mate, pragmatic relationships among bodies and 
technologies to be pervasive. I also understand te-
chnology very broadly as the outcome of any wor-
ld-making and -transforming activities: from fl int 
knapping tools to smartphones; from earthworks 
to cryptocurrencies; from spoken or signed, to 
written or machine language. I will now consider 
body-technology relations in terms of distributed 
agency (via actor-network theory), then in terms 
of habituation (via postphenomenology), before 
amalgamating these approaches in a concept I 
call ‘ensemble’.2
Actor-network theory (hereafter, ANT) is 
partly an approach to agency that includes te-
chnologies, or ‘nonhumans’ (Latour, 1994; Latour, 
1988). Here, agency requires only that something 
modifi es the action of something else: anything 
that does so—whether a person, text, technology, 
habit, or concept—is a veritable actor, or ‘actant’ 
(Latour, 1999; Mol, 2010). Humans and nonhu-
mans are symmetrical in this respect. Humans 
are customarily overestimated as sources of pure 
agency, yet nonhumans participate in most hu-
man actions (Mol, 2010). Nonhumans, meanwhi-
le, are not passive vehicles for human agency, but 
full-fl edged actants. This is because agency does 
not ultimately separate into the pure activity of 
subjects and pure passivity of objects. First, it is 
not occasioned by a single subject or object; agen-
cy is an emergent property of sets of associations 
among humans and nonhumans, called ‘actor-net-
works’. These very associations are what afford 
actors their capacity to act. And, second, partici-
pants in such networks modify their associates 
(Pyyhtinen and Tamminen, 2011). Put differently, 
actants acquire their specifi c properties, capaciti-
es, and dispositions in a network from their asso-
ciations: “[a]ctors are enacted, enabled, and adap-
ted by their associates while in their turn enacting, 
enabling and adapting these” (Mol, 2010, 260). In 
Bruno Latour’s well-known example (1999), ne-
ither shooter nor fi rearm are the total cause when 
a gun is fi red. The agency is realised by a compo-
site person-gun agent whose participants modify 
each other: the person has different capacities 
and proclivities when armed; the weapon has dif-
ferent capacities and affordances when held. The-
re are many alternative terms to ‘actor-network’. I 
will use ‘enactment’, which captures how “acting 
and being enacted go together” (Mol and Law, 
2004, 50): something is enacted by the relations 
that constitute it, which concurrently enacts an 
agency or effect.
I will also draw upon postphenomenology for 
its focus on bodily praxis, including how relations 
with technologies become so familiar that bodies 
and technologies can be ignored during activity 
(Ihde, 1990; Ihde, 1993; Ihde, 2003; Rosenberger 
and Verbeek, 2015). This deep familiarity is thanks 
to what Don Ihde calls a “polymorphous sense of 
bodily extension” (1990, 74), whereby the bounda-
ries of the lived body contract or dilate according 
to present associations and goals, such that te-
chnologies become ‘incorporated’ within lived em-
bodiment. These no longer feel entirely separate; 
attention goes ‘through’ them towards the activity 
enabled by the body-technology coupling (Ihde, 
1990). Incorporation is possible thanks to ‘habit 
memory’ (Bergson, 1988), which is the bodily past 
as habituated into comportments. This accrues as 
repeated activities—relations with others, things, 
situations—gradually give rise to sedimented 
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bodily dispositions. Henri Bergson distinguishes 
habit memory from recollection. The latter repre-
sents a past event like an image, making it prior 
to and separate from the current recollective act, 
and ultimately disconnected from present action. 
Habit memory, by contrast, continuously informs 
current perception and action, by prolonging a 
conserved bodily past into the present, without 
explicit representation or refl ection. It continually 
enlivens things and environments by imbuing the-
se with practical meaning: it makes familiar tools 
immediately available for use, and traces custo-
mary situations with vectors of possible action. I 
follow Robert Rosenberger (2014) to use ‘stabili-
sation’ to describe habituated bodily techniques 
that come alive spontaneously and non-refl ective-
ly upon encountering the relevant technology. Im-
portantly, habituation not only means that an ac-
tion has become familiar (Ahmed, 2007), or even 
that bodies acquire immediate cues from familiar 
things and situations. It means actions can be per-
formed with scant preparation, while the body, and 
often the technology, recede from attention during 
the action. Indeed, attending to these would dis-
rupt activity. Ihde calls this condition ‘transparen-
cy’ (1990). The canonical example is eyeglasses: 
the wearer looks through these, they transform vi-
sion, but attention is squarely upon what is seen; 
body and glasses are marginal throughout. Ihde 
identifi es four distinct types of technological rela-
tion. Two are salient here.3 I have just discussed 
one: ‘embodiment relations’ wherein technologies 
are incorporated during habitual bodily activity. 
The others are ‘background relations’ involving the 
likes of shelter technology, traffi  c control systems, 
automatic household appliances, lighting, and 
temperature systems. These contribute to activity 
without being incorporated. They fall farther out-
side both body and awareness, to “remain in the 
background or become a kind of near-technologi-
cal environment itself” (Ihde, 1990, 108).
 Ensembles and Abilities
I will now amalgamate these approaches—espe-
cially their insights concerning distributed agency 
and habit memory—by outlining what I call ‘ensem-
bles’.4 These describe associations of relatively 
proximal elements that are conjoined, organised, 
and maintained around bodies during engaged 
activity. Bodies enter relations to make something 
happen; ensembles are arrangements that make 
things happen. Body, hammer, nail, surface: all are 
elements of a (simplifi ed) hammering ensemble. 
Such associations enact capacities and affor-
dances that otherwise would be different or im-
possible. Ensembles are everywhere and are very 
prosaic: they include relations with eyeglasses, 
microscopes, hammers, bicycles, smartphones. 
As geared towards activity, they obtain just as long 
as the activity obtains: after hammering, a body 
transitions to another ensemble—albeit with some 
continuities of association—and acquire different 
capacities. Bodies vary in their powers, and are 
constituted differently, according to the character 
of their associations (Spinoza, 1996).
I take from ANT that agency is a property of 
a relational ensemble. Furthermore, activity sel-
dom, if ever, involves just a body and a technology. 
It encompasses multiple, heterogeneous, and 
potentially widely distributed relations among ac-
tants that each contribute something to activity. I 
take from postphenomenology that habit memory 
stabilises and organises this relational manifold. 
Ensembles are particular types of enactment, 
that meaningfully involve habit memory. Each te-
chnological relation in the ensemble has its cor-
responding stabilisation: some are stabilised em-
bodiment relations; others, stabilised background 
relations. The former type involves incorporati-
on of the technology; the latter does not. Never-
theless, both types involve transparency: sponta-
neous activity wherein both body and technology 
recede from awareness. Many such relations can 
be at work simultaneously, organised by habit me-
mory according to current aims. Habit memory 
permits bodies to negotiate complex associations 
with relative fl uidity (though, as we will see, this 
involves much more than bodily powers). Bodies 
do not experience these relations as decompo-
sed elements, but as opportunities or predica-
ments, routes or blockages, tools that are intuitive 
or obscure, places that are habitable or hostile. 
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When someone cycles to work, the ensemble in-
cludes not only relatively constant embodiment 
relations (body, bicycle, helmet, eyeglasses), but 
other changing relations (weather and air quality, 
and crucially, background relations with concrete 
roads, tree-lined avenues, traffi  c systems, spatial 
distributions).
Overall, then—in contradistinction with indi-
vidualist and instrumental accounts—no division 
exists here between mental and bodily aspects; 
the body is no object, but a dynamic complex of 
relational comportments that produces itself th-
rough activity. It continually goes beyond itself 
towards incipient possibilities: it never realises a 
complete state. It continually goes outside itself 
in relation with other bodies, things, situations: its 
composition varies with ensembles. Consequent-
ly, we cannot defi ne the body by an intrinsic pro-
perty (Watkin, 2017). Moreover, we nowhere en-
counter entirely unconditioned humans using truly 
passive objects. Agency and capacities emerge 
from distributed and relational complexes. Conse-
quently, we also cannot defi ne humans by an es-
sential host capacity (Watkin, 2017). Indeed, sin-
ce different, transformative relations are always 
possible, there cannot be any fi nal accounting of 
bodily powers (Deleuze, 1988). Rather than esca-
ping attachments, freedom becomes a matter of 
being well-attached, making possible the question 
of what ‘well-attached’ might mean (Moser, 2006).
One of my aims when discussing autonomy 
and agency is to contrast different versions of abi-
lity. Understood through the autonomy account, 
ability is a spontaneous, ever-present capacity of 
bounded, individual human subjects; disability is 
a bodily condition that perturbs this capacity. In 
my preferred alternative, however, ability resem-
bles relational and distributed agency. If the abi-
lity to do something involves technologies, these 
are part of that ability. Abilities are not innate, but 
enacted in and by ensembles: as Reynolds writes, 
they “neither end nor begin at the skin, but instead 
supervene on and extend to the world in which 
one lives and on which one ever depends” (2018, 
S34). This holds whether the enabling elements 
are proximal, as in a hammer, or distal, as in the 
agency distributed through every point of a metro 
system (Galis, 2011). Indeed, most situations will 
involve a combination of these. Put otherwise, abi-
lities are complex, and produced in spatially and 
temporally expansive networks: the ability to run a 
fi ve-kilometre race involves myriad factors—equip-
ment, environmental conditions, childhood and 
adult interests, economic situation—that greatly 
surpass the body (Reynolds, 2018). Finally, abiliti-
es are dynamic, and enacted moment by moment: 
they hold just so long as the network holds, and 
vary as bodies move through ensembles.
This suggests a ‘universal cyborgism’ whe-
rein all bodies are prosthetically scaffolded. If in-
volvement with technologies is the rule and not 
the exception, and agency is realised with, rather 
than by escaping, attachments (Moser, 2006), 
the dichotomy between innate ability and disabi-
lity evaporates. At minimum, and running counter 
to individualistic and medicalised models, many 
disabilities are not caused exclusively by individual 
bodies.5 Yet the categories of ability and disability 
do not also dissolve. These may not be intrinsic 
characteristics, but they exist, as real outcomes 
of unequal distribution of technological resources 
among different bodies. Before elaborating how 
disability happens, I must outline how distribution 
happens more generally.
 Technology, The Human, and 
Disability
Realisation of agency and sedimentation of habits 
occur in pre-existing technological surroundings. 
These surroundings have been modifi ed, or prepa-
red for activity. This modifi cation has a long histo-
ry, because technological development is bound 
up with the development of ‘the human’ itself. I do 
not mean that humans just happen to use techno-
logies, but that technological activities constitute 
the human as human (Zylinska, 2010). Human and 
technology are reciprocal causes with a common 
history (Malafouris, 2016; Introna, 2014; Latour, 
2003). Consequently, there is no question of dra-
wing back the technological curtain to reveal an 
innocent human essence. The human—whate-
ver that means—is progressively specifi ed by its 
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associations (Latour, 1999): were there anything 
characteristically human, it would be found among 
these associations.
The ‘shape’ of the human, then, is not a 
natural given; it coheres via the organisation of 
technological relations. Bodies are not imme-
diately and simply human; they become human 
because various technological distributions—or, 
enactments—instantiate, stabilise and propaga-
te activities that come to be called human. The 
entities and situations that comprise human exi-
stence, however complex and far-reaching, do not 
ultimately decompose into enduring brute givens 
and ephemeral social constructs. ‘The social’ is 
instead “materially heterogeneous: talk, bodies, 
texts, machines, architectures, all of these and 
many more are implicated in and perform the ‘so-
cial’” (Law, 1993, 2). Entities are comprised of rela-
tions among heterogeneous materials, and the in-
teractions that organise and maintain these. They 
are effects of ‘ordering practices’ (Mol, 2010; Mo-
ser, 2006; Law, 1993), that organise and distribute 
relations among these heterogeneous materials, 
to enact entities as the kinds of things they are. 
The stability of enactments is neither given in ad-
vance nor secured in one blow: associations “gra-
dually come to hang together by means of small 
forces” (Mol, 2002, 70). Coherence is never fi nal, 
and ongoing effort is necessary: maintaining as-
sociations, reducing frictions, bridging gaps, even 
“keeping potentially competing versions of reali-
ty… out of each other’s way” (Mol, 2010, 264). Whi-
le practice is central, intercorporeal interactions 
are insuffi  cient to cement associations and circu-
late these across time and space (Latour, 2005). 
This brings us back to nonhumans, which are not 
only full-fl edged actors, but also essential partici-
pants in enactments (Law, 1992): associations are 
more stable and durable, power can travel further, 
when “exercised through things that don’t sleep 
and associations that don’t break down” (Latour, 
2005, 70). Nevertheless, a particular effect or pow-
er relation still requires the relevant associations: 
prison walls accomplish confi nement only when 
guards are also present (Law, 1992). With enough 
durable connections, an enacted entity can be-
come a quasi-universal, seemingly independent 
“‘macro’ feature of the ‘whole’ world” (Latour, 2005, 
180).
This returns us to consideration of the pre-
eminent account of the human. The various orde-
rings that enact the human are far from systematic 
or exhaustive: they involve countless overlapping 
regimes, including many that are incompatible or 
even antagonistic. Furthermore, modernity ramifi -
es the number and complexity of relations in which 
bodies are enfolded, making it increasingly diffi  cult 
to establish defi nite origins or foundations. Never-
theless, the human is also intimately linked with 
a coincident but countervailing modern aspiration 
to ‘purify’ what exists into the discrete categories 
‘Society’ and ‘Nature’ (Latour, 1993). While there 
exists no originary and insuperable ontological di-
vision between social and natural kinds—indeed, 
“it is this very division which is a complete arte-
fact” (Latour, 2005, 76)—this bifurcation is effectu-
ally foundational because it is done as such. This 
major vector of power runs through modern orde-
ring practices: while myriad domains that emerge 
within or are transformed by modernity—science, 
economics, medicine—assemble heterogeneous 
actants, they sort these into social subjects and 
natural objects. They attribute the powers of di-
stributed agents to humans alone, while denying 
nonhuman agency and reducing these to passive 
objects (Watkin, 2017). This engenders the chara-
cteristic modern worldview: here, an exceptional 
domain of freedom, value, subjectivity, populated 
solely by the self-identical and self-governing hu-
man subject (Shildrick, 2012); there, an inhuman 
outside world of determinism, meaninglessness, 
and objectivity, in which exist bodies and technolo-
gies. This notion of the human may be an effect of 
modern ordering practices (Sharon, 2014), but this 
makes it no less robust or effi  cacious. It remains a 
guiding motif for distribution of technologies.
We can also understand one aspect of disa-
bility in this way: disability as a brute fact or ob-
jective bodily property. I suggest that disabilities 
qua objects are enactments: stabilised effects of 
associations among bodies, texts, statements, 
artefacts, objectives, and so on, maintained by 
“masses of little overlapping and variably succes-
sful practices” (Law and Singleton, 2013, 499). 
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Many different enactments coexist: disability as 
biological reality, oppressive social arrangements, 
resistant group identity. The same body can be 
enacted as disabled differently in different si-
tes (Mol, 2002). Some enactments oppose, cha-
fe against, or even repel one another; others are 
complementary, and fortify one another. No one 
captures the fi nal truth of disability, which, as a 
relational effect, lacks objectivity and self-identity 
(Kafer, 2013). Despite this plurality, medical and 
medically-informed enactments of disability pre-
dominate. Modern disciplines tend to view bodily 
and cognitive anomalies as biological problems 
that warrant medical solutions. This produces 
knowledges (e.g., scientifi c discourses that inau-
gurate new diagnostic categories), practices (e.g., 
medical intervention, rehabilitation), and subje-
ctivities (e.g., ‘disabled people’) (Tremain, 2018; 
Foucault, 2001b; Stiker, 1999). Such approaches 
involve a predilection for normalisation guided by 
the notion of the normal, autonomous subject: re-
storation, correction, or rehabilitation, even biopo-
litical strategies of elimination (Kafer, 2013). Cru-
cially, while medical approaches purport merely to 
produce positive knowledge, and to intervene into 
problems that exist on a natural and value-free re-
gister, their activities precisely enact disability as 
a biological defect localised in a pathological in-
dividual body, and consequently as a brute natural 
given (Tremain, 2018). Here, the purifying modern 
logic is evident: disability is evacuated of its com-
plex, relational status, and redistributed into the 
body—itself placed with a natural domain—as a 
problem for positive science. Medicalised approa-
ches and normalising tendencies have spread far 
beyond the remit of medical professionals (Kafer, 
2013): they largely inform common-sense under-
standings of disability, as well as bioethics, medi-
cal ethics, and theories of justice (Tremain, 2018; 
Boorse, 1977; Buchanan et al., 2000).
 Disability and the Uneven 
Distribution of  Agency
Disability exists in another register: as something 
that happens to bodies during practical activity in 
environments that do not support them. This aspe-
ct of disability will be the focus of what remains. 
In the enactments I just discussed, disability is 
enacted by explicit regard: medically-informed 
practices single out atypical bodies, to enact the-
se as disabled via diagnosis or rehabilitative stra-
tegies. Now, I mean that another aspect of disa-
bility occurs due to disregard: atypical bodies are 
not accounted for in the distribution of everyday 
enabling relations, resulting in environments that 
do not permit them to live (Stiker, 1999). These 
aspects are closely linked. If the preeminent pic-
ture of disability is as an objective deviation from 
the human norm, preferred responses will aim, 
where possible, to ‘return’ someone to the sanc-
tioned normal condition. Modifying the everyday 
world will be, at best, of secondary importance, 
especially when that world is taken as an objecti-
ve background.
I will now fl esh out this practical aspect of 
disability. I said that abilities generally involve par-
ticipation from technological resources. Common-
place technological environments are products of 
a long history of ordering practices, organised by 
explicit and implicit norms about what is proper 
to the human (Pyyhtinen and Tamminen, 2011; 
Foucault, 2001a). Which orderings become stabili-
sed, which technologies become ubiquitous, refl e-
ct what has been valued and endorsed as human 
(Mitchell, 2020). After all, technologies are coun-
terparts of conduct, that “elicit from us the sort of 
behaviours we have come to call ‘human’” (Watkin, 
2017, 179). This is also seen in how technologies 
are fi ne-tuned or ‘tailored’ to readily allow incorpo-
ration and stabilisation. Put differently, technologi-
es anticipate how they will be used, are orientated 
towards the bodies that will use them (Ahmed, 
2006; Rosenberger, 2014).
Ordering and tailoring practices have been 
partial and uneven: they have overwhelming as-
sembled technologies around the material proper-
ties of typical bodies. I use ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ 
here as admittedly imperfect indicators that bo-
dies are merely numerically common or unusual, 
without also imputing innate ability or disability. 
Typical bodies, then, are “enabled to act in and 
by the practices and relations in which they are 
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located, and… become actors because agency 
is distributed and attributed” (Moser, 2006, 384). 
They can readily form ensembles, and acquire the 
associated agencies. Not only that. Such ordering 
is structured by the guiding motif of modernity: the 
autonomous human, or ‘normal subject’. Indeed, 
it is only on account of practices, both historical 
and contemporary, that have distributed techno-
logical resources around typical bodies, that they 
can move and act in ways that correspond with 
the autonomy they are alleged to possess natural-
ly (Moser, 2009). The modern, able self is fl eshed 
out by its technological consorts, and can realise 
the standard of the ‘properly human’. For ability 
to be enacted reliably and repeatedly, the appro-
priate technologies must consistently be in place; 
otherwise “many, if not most, bodies end up dis-ab-
led” (Reynolds, 2018, S34). However, technologies 
routinely do meet typical bodies halfway, bringing 
abilities to life.
If ordering practices enable typical bodies, 
they have rarely acknowledged or accommoda-
ted those outside the sphere of purported norma-
lity. Atypical bodies have been ignored within, or 
placed outside, the domain of validated human 
action. However, this disregard is not truly pas-
sive, or simple oversight. The centring of typical 
bodies does not just happen in the natural course 
of events. Making a habitable world for any body 
requires effort. Expending effort on some bodies 
simultaneously de-centres others: it distributes 
enabling relations away from them, to positively 
produce the conditions for disability to happen 
(Moser, 2006). One aspect of disability occurs 
because ordering practices create routes to agen-
cy for typical bodies at the expense of atypical 
bodies. This distributes agency away from the 
latter, making alternative ways of interacting less 
realisable. Disability, like ability, does not reduce to 
physical properties. It exists within body-techno-
logy arrangements, at the level of ensembles. It is 
not intrinsic to atypical bodies that they cannot act 
in some environment; historically-ordered environ-
ments accommodate activity only for typical bodi-
es. In a time-worn example, a wheelchair-user be-
comes disabled only on encountering space that 
is incompatible with their capacities. In congruent 
spaces, ability happens, because they enter an en-
semble whose elements—that include their body—
can create agency.
 Mundane Technology and the 
Technological Unconscious
However, ability and disability do not only involve 
straightforward presence or absence of appropria-
te technological associates. They also involve the 
degree of ease bodies feel about entering techno-
logical relations. To address this, I will now build 
upon the foregoing ANT-inspired section by taking 
a more phenomenological tack that considers the 
roles of habit and anticipation in both ability and 
disability, and how inadequate technological sup-
port frustrates habituation and familiarisation, to 
hamper more general ease in the world.
While this involves technological relations in 
general, I am particularly interested in some that re-
semble Ihde’s background relations. Those, recall, 
involve technologies that are not incorporated du-
ring activity, but instead are part of a quasi-natural 
technological background. I will fi rst expand upon 
Ihde’s defi nition, to call ‘intermundane technology’ 
anything artefactual, whether simple or complex, 
that contributes to activity without being incorpo-
rated, where that contribution eludes attention, 
and—as we will soon see—that is orientated only 
to certain bodies, even though this is not obvi-
ous. Even walking typically involves technology. 
A pathway is as much a technology—for expedit-
ing movement, but also for demarcating territory, 
domesticating ‘nature’, modifying spatio-temporal 
relations—as is a stone axe or a smartphone. It 
is a modifi cation, undertaken for human activi-
ties, whose consequent role in ambulation—in a 
walking ensemble—typically goes undiscerned. 
Alongside Ihde’s examples—shelter technology, 
traffi  c control systems, automatic household ap-
pliances, lighting and temperature systems—we 
might consider other mundane technological fe-
atures and characteristics: the textures, dimensi-
ons and gradients of pathways and roads; the di-
mensions of everyday and domestic spaces, and 
how elements are distributed therein (for instance, 
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standardised heights for counters and light swit-
ches); distances between buildings in public 
space; lighting and shade. These fall somewhe-
re between technical artefact and environmental 
feature. These are mundane not only due to their 
ordinariness, but—as the etymological antecedent 
mundus suggests—because they are immersed 
within a background world and scarcely register 
as artefactual at all. Where embodied technologi-
es invite engagement and become incorporated, 
intermundane technologies are simply assumed, 
without incorporation. By inter-, I mean that the-
se modifi cations exist ‘between’ or ‘among’ other 
technologies. Because they are not incorporated, 
their contribution generally is not closely linked to 
an activity or goal. They are more like connective 
tissue between more evident tools, and perform 
an auxiliary role from the obscure periphery of 
ensembles. Despite their marginal status within 
awareness, they are highly consequential: as 
ubiquitous semi-constants, these contribute to 
and expedite agency by quietly supporting enga-
gements with other technologies, and smoothing 
out movements within, and transitions between, 
technological environments.
Intermundane technologies resemble aspe-
cts of what Nigel Thrift (2004) calls the ‘techno-
logical unconscious’. Bodies, Thrift suggests, 
repeatedly stage relations with quotidian te-
chnological artefacts: from roads and lighting to 
cables, screens, and wireless signals. Through 
repetition, there arises a “prepersonal substrate 
of guaranteed correlations, assured encounters, 
and therefore unconsidered anticipations” (Thrift, 
2004, 177). Thanks to “their utter familiarity” 
(Thrift, 2008, 91), these technologies sit in the 
background and scarcely register as products of 
human work. Moreover, relations with these also 
acquire a quasi-natural status. This technological 
unconscious, then, encompasses both technolo-
gical environments made to efface or naturalise 
themselves, whose contribution to activity goes 
unheeded (these resemble intermundane techno-
logies); and correlated bodily comportments that 
tacitly anticipate these environments (these re-
semble the stabilisations of habit memory). The 
technological unconscious is like the totality of 
stabilisations with mundane and intermundane 
technologies, and the technologies themselves. 
When this state obtains, not only can bodies gene-
rally transition from here to there—from ensemble 
to ensemble—with unbroken transitions. Crucially, 
they can anticipate that such transitions will go 
smoothly.
 Unsafe Ground
For the most part, these conditions are avai-
lable only to typical bodies. They inherit a world 
in which things are already ‘reachable’ (Ahmed, 
2007), having been ordered to ensure smooth 
passages (Moser and Law, 1999). This has se-
veral outcomes. These bodies can comfortably 
stabilise technological relations. These relations 
can enable without demanding explicit attention, 
especially intermundane forms whose artefactu-
ality is already obscure. Situations simply appear 
habitable, as availing possibilities, while all the 
work involved in producing and maintaining such 
habitability can disappear. Typical bodies need 
not explicitly thematise how to act in common en-
vironments; they simply can ‘do things’. Finally, the 
point where body ends and world begins becomes 
obscure (Ahmed, 2007).
Since these conditions obtain in most situ-
ations, typical bodies generally experience smoo-
th transitions, while perturbations are limited in 
amount and extent. They can enjoy a feeling of 
extempore and endogenous freedom. A well-esta-
blished technological unconscious, then, is like 
transparency writ large: it allows bodies to gene-
rally, reliably, and repeatedly forget themselves 
and their relations. Typical bodies fi nd their wor-
ld, if not homely, at least manageable. This also 
engenders a generalised sense of spontaneity: a 
feeling that free action is possible even in environ-
ments that have yet to be encountered. I do not 
mean that activity is always perfectly fl uid, only 
that when the preponderance of encounters goes 
smoothly, an anticipatory dimension of agency re-
sults: an ‘ambient faith’ in the world at large. Be-
nefi ciaries can confi dently anticipate that in most 
cases, the world will come to them as they go to 
Jonathan Paul Mitchell
34Women, Gender & Research
Unsafe Ground: Technology, Habit and the Enactment of  Disability
No. 2 2021
the world, that neither body nor technologies will 
cause problems or stall the fl ow of action.
This is a second dimension of agency, in ad-
dition to its distributed character. Not only do te-
chnologies participate in the enaction of abilities, 
where these are understood as ‘bare’ functional 
capacities. The ‘shape’ of technologies permits 
stabilisation, which is part of the capacity to act 
extemporaneously. As such, the technologies are 
part of that capacity. Phenomenology suggests 
that bodies have an ‘I can’ relation with the wor-
ld—they can simply gear into possibilities without 
refl ection—on account of bodily powers of habitu-
ation. I suggest, however, that spontaneous action 
also centrally involves the continual, silent presen-
ce of countless technological auxiliaries: embodi-
ed and intramundane technologies, arrayed to not 
only avail of avail of use, but to extend the shape 
of the body (Ahmed, 2006).
Disability also has an anticipatory dimensi-
on. This involves consequences for stabilisation 
and transparency when technologies are unsui-
table or absent. Since most ordinary embodied te-
chnologies—stationery, cutlery, computers, auto-
mobiles—are tailored for typical bodies, anyone 
outside this range of bodily characteristics may 
fi nd these less manageable. This hinders incorpo-
ration, and formation of durable habitual relations. 
As for intermundane technologies, the fact that 
these are not incorporated, are not brought close 
to bodies, may suggest that they are not tailored 
towards particular users. However, they are just as 
much orientated to typical bodies. An apparently 
unremarkable walkway surface may be a tripping 
hazard; what seems like natural interior light may 
induce migraines; an ostensibly manageable di-
stance between conference venues may prove 
exhausting. These background technological ar-
rangements are far from obvious, but are tailored 
to the properties of typical bodies, and can disable 
atypical bodies. This also frustrates the formation 
of stable relationships with these dimensions.
However, the world does not always and 
identically frustrate expectations. Agency is 
not precluded outright. That atypical bodies are 
de-centred does not mean they are entirely ig-
nored. Rather, they are enabled inconsistently, in 
something like what Florence Caeymaex calls a 
“continual process of inclusion and exclusion, and 
the unequal distribution of agency” (2014, 112). 
The aforementioned non-visual man may enjoy 
spontaneous activity thanks to prosthetic incor-
poration. However, when this complementary ar-
rangement associates with non-complementary 
elements, agency collapses: “[w]hen he cannot 
safely cross a street because of a lack of curb 
cuts or audible walk signals, that incorporation is 
also disrupted” (Reynolds, 2017, 424). Again, this 
has more general effects. Where enablement is in-
consistent and perturbations more likely, relations 
between body and space cannot readily be forgot-
ten. Someone may navigate their accessible cam-
pus comfortably using colour-coding signage and 
differentiated fl oor surfaces. This does not mean 
that they can expect to do so when visiting ano-
ther campus. The point is not that they cannot—it 
may well be accessible—but that they cannot do 
so spontaneously, without planning. They realise, 
correctly, that environments generally distribute 
agency away from bodies like theirs. Overall, so-
meone may incorporate certain technologies, but 
not to the point of transparency, because these 
are not made with them in mind; they may carve 
out a sphere in which spontaneous action is possi-
ble, but when moving beyond this, fi nd that things 
change. This can lead to something broader and 
more general concerning the sense of possibility: 
the obverse of ambient faith, which I call ‘unsafe 
ground’. This does not mean one can never act, 
but that a not-quite-habitable world unsettles con-
fi dence that it will support possibilities (Ratcliffe, 
2012). A permanent question hangs over the relia-
bility of relations. Uncertainty colours encounters. 
This impedes formation of robust stabilisations 
with technological environments (or perhaps un-
certainty itself becomes a disposition).
This has additional ramifi cations concer-
ning anticipation about the future in a general 
sense (Ratcliffe et al., 2014; Ratcliffe, 2012). While 
formed via repetition, habits are fulcrums for in-
novate activities, and means “of altering our exi-
stence through incorporating new instruments” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 145). They anchor the 
vectors that run from present realities to future 
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possibilities. By destabilising habituation, unsafe 
ground attenuates this anticipatory structure: it 
dampens the potential to reckon otherwise, to in-
carnate new relations, to imagine that things will 
be different (Ratcliffe et al., 2014; Ratcliffe, 2012). 
It slackens the threads connecting anticipation to 
what Matthew Ratcliffe calls ‘teleological time’: di-
rectedness toward more remote but not necessa-
rily less determinate goals. Instead of a future of 
signifi cant possibility, there is one where possibili-
ties are bounded in advance.
 (In)visibilisation
Finally, I will outline how the local enabling and 
disabling events I have just discussed contribute 
to the wider effect of naturally-able and natural-
ly-disabled bodies. This centrally involves how te-
chnological distributions become invisible even as 
they enable or disable. I concur with Moser (1999) 
that enactment of the entity called the ‘normal 
subject’ involves how technological distributions 
produce agency while remaining invisible. Not 
only is technology “made invisible by its own suc-
cess” (Latour, 1999, 304), standing out only when 
malfunctioning or ill-fi tting. Further, since techno-
logies are ordered around the contours of typical 
bodies, technologies generally do work for them, 
and “agency [fl ows] without constant interruption” 
(Moser, 2006, 384). Their technologically en-abled 
status does not come into focus: they become 
normal subjects without needing to stake any 
claim as such (Moser and Law, 1999). Bodies that 
meet normative standards, though technologi-
cally-enabled, are attributed freedom in the same 
measure that the enabling role is leeched away 
from technologies, including all the work, both hi-
storical and contemporary, that goes into making 
such enablement happen. Again, technologies get 
inscribed in a passive domain of things: “the com-
monsense external background of human and so-
cial action” (Latour, 1999, 308). Additionally, the 
consolidation of the normal subject involves ha-
bituation. When technologies can be smoothly in-
corporated, and transparency can result, this only 
ramifi es the existing propensity of technologies 
to become obscure. In such cases, technologies 
are invisibilised because working, and transpa-
rent because familiarised. The body, for its part, 
can ‘trail behind’ action, to also become invisible 
(Ahmed, 2006). What really gets invisibilised here 
is the pre-established compatibility of technologi-
es with some bodies: a compatibility that permits 
this very invisibilisation, that is not natural, and is 
the effect of ordering work. Moreover, habituation 
occurs in contexts where the prevailing common 
sense has the idea of active subjects and passive 
objects as an implicit premise, and in whose orde-
rings the shape of the autonomous human subject 
is deeply ingrained. The upshot is that the normal 
subject, already common sense, is confi rmed time 
and again—often on a habituated and pre-refl exive 
level—for those whose bodies already fi t.
For atypical bodies such invisibilisation is 
often impracticable. Disturbances occur. Since 
neither relations nor body can disappear, trans-
parency is less achievable. Moser suggests that 
“the distributions remain visible and present in the 
situation” (2006, 385). Indeed, an incongruity ma-
nifests in relations between body and world. This 
‘visibilisation’ could provide an impetus for radical 
revaluation, were it accompanied by recognition 
that the congruence of any body whatsoever with 
environments is no natural occurrence, but the re-
sult of ordering work. However, this is made unli-
kely by the common-sense position in which the 
world is objective and independent: here, all bodi-
es inhabit the same space, that affords the same 
opportunities to each, in the same way. This being 
so, when disruptions do occur, even allowing that 
these are arise from a mis-fi t between body and 
world, the ultimate cause cannot be the world. Af-
ter all, normal subjects can act there without dis-
ruption. The problem must instead fl ow from the 
body that does not fi t (Garland-Thomson, 2011). 
Put differently, a common-sense picture of free 
subjects and passive objects cannot accommoda-
te relational agency: when ‘visibilisation’ occurs, 
focus does not remain on relations. Intermundane 
technologies are especially germane here. Whe-
re embodied technologies are at least somewhat 
conspicuous when not working, when intermun-
dane forms do not cooperate, they simply remain 
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obscure. Overall, when disability occurs, the locus 
of disruption is shifted away from relations and 
towards the atypical body. It is made visible, even 
hypervisible, precisely as a problem. This is ano-
ther way the heterogeneous and relational reality 
of disability gets reduced and simplifi ed. A pro-
blem of disabling distributions becomes one of 
pathological bodies.
 Concluding Remarks
Ability and disability are not inherent bodily pro-
perties. They are events, enacted by relations 
among bodies and extra-somatic bits and pieces 
of the world. Indeed, ability is different from ‘nor-
mal ability’. Ability emerges from relations: “if the 
networks are in place, if the prostheses are wor-
king, then there is ability” (Moser and Law, 1999, 
201). This holds for typical and atypical bodies 
alike. Each can enjoy ability. Merely atypical em-
bodiment neither equals nor causes disability. 
Normal ability is different. It is that type of ability 
that occurs fi rst, between a typical body and nor-
malised relations; second, where technologies 
are ordered to allow such bodies to feel at ease in 
the world; and third, where relational aspects of 
ability get obscured. Disability, as I have discus-
sed it, occurs, fi rst, because normalised relations 
do not enable atypical bodies; second, because 
this produces a sense that the world is not gene-
rally hospitable; and third, because atypical bodi-
es are made visible as problems. This is not an 
exhaustive explanation of disability. Disability is 
produced within a great many regimes, from reli-
gious to medical, moral to legal, to administrative 
and bureaucratic. What I have described is just 
one vector of its production that becomes imbri-
cated with these others.
The organisation of technologies, then, is 
highly consequential. Living involves association 
with myriad technological elements. Some, as 
incorporated, may be intimately involved in that 
life. Others, while less intimate, still comprise 
a persistent dimension of activity. All are parti-
cipants in engagements through which bodies 
constitute themselves. Atypical bodies fi nd parti-
cipants consistently unsympathetic. This attenu-
ates agency, ungrounds habit, and erodes confi -
dence in a world. Such effects unsettle, or even 
preclude, the establishment of secure footing 
from which to launch the projects that comprise 
a life. Resistance to these effects entails focus 
upon ability as much as disability: a recognition 
that ability is relational and distributed in every 
case; that the normal subject and its putative 
autonomy are effects of enabling technologies; 
that the primacy of the latter, and the invisibilisa-
tion of its technological enablement, have delete-
rious consequences for atypical bodies. Such re-
cognition would help to dissolve sharp categorial 
distinctions between ability and disability, and 
could greatly expand the scope when imagining 
how all bodies might live with technologies.
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Notes
1 Though this example is certainly open to criticism, like that of (Reynolds, 2017)
2 I will not address the acknowledged differences or incompatibilities between actor-network theory and 
postphenomenology. For work on this topic, see (Langsdorf, 2015; Kroes and Verbeek, 2014; Verbeek, 
2009)
3 The others are hermeneutic relations (with technologies like wristwatches, that feature a readout or dis-
play that, when interpreted, gives a transformed relation with the world); and alterity relations (with, e.g., 
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